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A MATTER OF CLASS: THE IMPACT OF BROWN v. McLEAN
ON EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
"We have seen the enemy and sometimes he or she works [or worked]
for us."1 This may be the attitude that many employers have towards their
former (litigious) employees as current and former employees file an in-
creasing number of employment discrimination claims each year.2 Con-
gress originally enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 (Title
VII) to eliminate discriminatory hiring procedures, which prevented mi-
nority workers from enjoying equal employment opportunities. 4 Today,
however, the focus of Title VII has shifted from discriminatory hiring
1. Pamela R. Johnson & Julie Indvik, Rebels, Criticizers, Backstabbers, and Busy-
bodies: Anger and Aggression at Work, PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT., June 22, 2000, at 165.
2. See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Employment Discrimination: Moving Beyond
McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination
Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 660 (1998) (noting that employment discrimination
suits constitute substantial part of all lawsuits); Johnson & Indvik, supra note 1, at
165 (stating that current or former employees file one out of every five lawsuits
nationwide); United States EEOC, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges FY
1992-JY 1999, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html (last modified Jan.
12, 2000) (noting that approximately 57,600 Title VII charges filed with EEOC in
1999 compared with 55,400 charges filed in 1992).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1995).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1995) (noting that it is unlawful for employers
to refuse to hire or discharge employee on basis of employee's protected attrib-
utes). The statute states, in pertinent part:
(a) Employer Practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; ....
Id.
The legislative history of Title VII also indicates that Congress' goal was to
create equal employment opportunities. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 26 (1963),
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (stating that Title VII's purpose is to
eliminate employment discrimination); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (noting that purpose of Title VII was to create equal
employment opportunities); E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I:
The Myth of the Protected Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REv.
441, 444 (1998) (noting purpose of Title VII); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, When Dif
ferent Means the Same: Applying a Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintiffs Under the
McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 53, 61 (1999)
(stating that Congress' primary concern in enacting Title VII was "the relegation of
Blacks to low-skill jobs").
(421)
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claims to discriminatory discharge claims. 5 Despite this dramatic shift,
the United States Supreme Court has never established the prima facie
elements that a plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge must show. 6 As
a result, a dispute has arisen among the federal circuit courts over the
relevancy of a plaintiffs replacement identity within the prima facie frame-
work for discriminatory discharge cases.
7
5. SeeJohn J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 983 (1991) ("[T]oday the vast
majority of all litigation suits challenge discrimination in discharge. Although the
authors and early architects of employment discrimination laws envisioned them as
tools for opening employment opportunities to blacks, women, and other minori-
ties, this is no longer their primary use."); see also Kenneth R. Gilberg, Employers
Must Protect Their Companies Against Employee Lawsuits, SUPERVISION, Nov. 1, 1992, at
12 (noting increasing numbers of employees file wrongful discharge suits against
their former employers).
6. See Elizabeth Clack-Freeman, Comment, Title VII and Plaintiffs Replacement:
A Prima Facie Consideration, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 463, 469 (1998) (stating that Court
has never addressed what plaintiffs in discriminatory discharge cases must show so
circuit courts had to define prima facie elements for discharge cases). The Su-
preme Court also established the proper order and allocation of proof for discrim-
inatory hiring cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See 411 U.S. at 802-04
(establishing burden-shifting system for employment discrimination cases). For a
further discussion of the burden-shifting system, see infra notes 32-37 and accom-
panying text. The first step of the three-step system requires a plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 802 (creat-
ing four elements of prima facie case). Although all federal courts have adopted
the burden-shifting system and the prima facie case for discriminatory discharge
claims, some courts have modified the prima facie elements. See BARBARA LINDE-
MANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 261-62 (David
A. Cathcart & R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr. eds., 2d ed. Supp. 1989) (noting that courts
apply burden-shifting system to discriminatory discharge claims but modify ele-
ments of prima facie case). In particular, courts tend to change the fourth ele-
ment of the prima facie case, in which the Supreme Court required a plaintiff
alleging discriminatory hiring to show that the employer continued to seek appli-
cants to fill the plaintiff's position. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (requir-
ing plaintiffs in discriminatory hiring cases to show employer sought replacement);
see also 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR 37, at 115 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter EMPLOYMENT] (noting courts have developed differing views on fourth
element).
7. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 490 ("Federal circuit courts continue to
wrestle with discharge cases where the plaintiff has been replaced by someone
from within his protected class."). Federal circuit courts have developed varying
views regarding the replacement requirement. Compare Lowry v. Bedford County
Sch. Bd., No. 98-1165, 1999 WL 507137, at *2 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (affirming
grant of summary judgment because plaintiff failed to show non-class replace-
ment), with Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir.
2000) (requiring plaintiff to show only that position was not eliminated after dis-
charge). In Kendrick, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court has yet to address the relevancy of a replacement's
identity. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1227 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 528 n.1 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)); see also Deborah C. Malamud, The
Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2245 (1995)
(stating Court did not "attempt to give any meaningful guidance as to how the
specification of the required prima facie proof would be determined for cases with
other facts").
[Vol. 46: p. 421
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In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,8 the United States Supreme Court
established the elements of a prima facie case, which a plaintiff alleging
discriminatory hiring must show.9 In the absence of the Supreme Court's
guidance, however, courts have encountered difficulties in applying this
framework to discriminatory discharge claims. 10 For example, in Brown v.
McLean,II the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
that to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, plaintiffs
must show that their employers replaced them with individuals from
outside of their protected class ("non-class replacement").' 2 Other fed-
eral courts, however, have expressly rejected this requirement, finding that
this strict approach does not take into account employers who, attempting
to avoid a discrimination suit, replaced the plaintiff with an individual
from within the plaintiff's protected class ("same-class replacement").' 3
Several courts also have found that an employer may discharge an em-
ployee because the employee does not meet the employer's stereotypical
image of a person from the employee's protected class. 1 4
8. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
9. See id. at 802 (stating plaintiff must show four elements to establish prima
facie case). The Supreme Court found that a plaintiff must show that he or she is a
member of a protected class; that he or she applied for and was qualified for the
job; that he or she was rejected and the position remained open and that the
employer continued to seek applicants. See id. at 802 (listing elements of prima
facie case of discriminatory hiring). Although the Supreme Court initially stated
the first element as requiring the plaintiff to show that he or she is a racial minor-
ity, the prima facie case arises regardless of whether or not they are a member of a
traditional minority group. See HENRY H. PERRrrT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL AND
PRACTICE § 2.3 (1992) (stating that every person belongs to protected class).
10. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 261-62 (noting courts apply vary-
ing modifications of prima facie elements); Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (stat-
ing court did not give guidance for application of framework in other contexts);
Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 469 (stating courts apply prima facie elements dif-
ferently in discriminatory discharge cases); see also Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d
1126, 1138 (10th Cir. 1999) (examining varying applications of fourth element of
prima facie framework in discriminatory discharge case); Pivirotto v. Innovative
Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 354 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting varying interpretations of prima
facie elements in discriminatory discharge cases).
11. 159 F.3d 898 (4th Cir. 1998).
12. See id. at 905-06 (holding failure to show non-class replacement precluded
plaintiff from establishing prima facie case). For a further discussion of the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Brown, see infra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (stating employer may hire same-class
employee to avoid discrimination suit); Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d
1529, 1535 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that employer may hire same-class replace-
ment to evade discrimination suits); see also EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 37, at 115
(noting persuasiveness of argument that employers may hire same class replace-
ment to avoid litigation).
14. See, e.g., Perry, 199 F.3d at 1137 (stating non-class replacement require-
ment would preclude suits against "an employer who terminates a woman it nega-
tively perceives as a 'feminist' and replaces her with a woman who is willing to be
subordinate to her male co-workers or replaces an African-American with an Afri-
can-American who is perceived to 'know his place'"); Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355
2001] NOTE
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This Note discusses the federal courts' viewpoints on the relevancy of
a plaintiffs replacement identity in establishing prima facie cases of dis-
criminatory termination under Title VII.15 Part II of this Note discusses
the United States Supreme Court's development of the prima facie frame-
work for discriminatory hiring cases and the federal courts' subsequent
adaptation of that framework to discriminatory termination cases. 16 Part
II also examines the varying circuit viewpoints on the relevancy of a plain-
tiffs replacement within this framework.1 7 Part III discusses the relevant
facts of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Brown v. McLean.18 Part IV ana-
lyzes and critiques the Fourth Circuit's improperly reasoned holding in
Brown.19 Finally, Part V addresses the adverse impact of requiring a plain-
tiff to prove that his or her replacement came from outside the plaintiff's
protected class. 20
II. BACKGROUND OF THE TITLE VII PRIMA FACIE CASE
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the Act") in response
to persistent discrimination against minority groups in the United
(rejecting non-replacement requirement because it precludes meritorious claims).
In Pivirotto, the Third Circuit reasoned that
[a]n employer's failure to hire someone of a different class from the
plaintiff, after the plaintiff's discharge, could be explained in many ways.
... [A]n employer may act on gender-based stereotypes, firing women it
perceives as not feminine enough (or as too feminine), or discharging
women who are too aggressive while not doing the same to male
employees.
Id.
Commentators also have noted that an employer's stereotypes may play an
important role in discharge decisions. See, e.g., 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.1 (2d ed. 1988) (stating employment decisions are often
motivated by decision-makers' stereotypical attitudes); Hellen Hemphill & Ray
Haines, Confronting Discrimination in Your Workplace, HR Focus, July 1, 1998, at S5
(noting prevalency of stereotypical attitudes).
15. For a discussion of the federal circuit courts' requirements regarding a
plaintiffs replacement identity in Title VII discriminatory termination cases, see
infra notes 38-85 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's development of the discrimina-
tory hiring prima facie case, see infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the federal courts' use of discriminatory hiring prima
facie framework in Title VII discriminatory termination cases, see infra notes 38-85
and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the facts of Brown, see infra notes 86-99 and accompa-
nying text.
19. For a discussion and analysis of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Brown,
see infra notes 100-71 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the possible consequences of requiring a plaintiff who
alleges Title VII discriminatory termination to show that his or her replacement
was from outside the plaintiffs protected class, see infra notes 172-82 and accom-
panying text.
[Vol. 46: p. 421
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States. 2 1 Title VII of the Act, which specifically prohibits discrimination in
the employment arena, was primarily enacted to create equal employment
opportunities for African-American workers.2 2 Title VII not only endeav-
ors to protect victims of discriminatory hiring procedures, it also protects
21. SeeH.R. REp. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2393 (noting prevalence of discrimination against minority groups, particularly Af-
rican Americans); see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 464 ("The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was passed in an attempt to bring the concept of equal rights into every
spectrum of life."). For a discussion of discrimination in the United States prior to
the adoption of the Civil Rights Act, see ABRAHAM L. DAVIS & BARBARA LUCK GRA-
HAM, THE SUPREME COURT, RACE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1995).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1995) (prohibiting employment discrimination);
H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 25, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (stating that
purpose of Title VII was "to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and infor-
mal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, re-
ligion, or national origin"); 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey) ("The crux of the problem is to open employment opportunities for
Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."); Ann C.
McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary
Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 210 (1993) (stating Con-
gress stressed equal employment opportunity is basic right when passing Title VII);
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 4, at 60 (noting Congress' primary purpose in enact-
ing Title VII was to protect African-American workers from discrimination); see also
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979) (noting that
Congress' primary concern in enacting Title VII was to create equal employment
opportunities for African Americans); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (stating purpose of Title VII was "to assure equality of employ-
ment opportunities and to eliminate discriminatory practices and devices which
have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority
citizens"); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (noting Congress
never intended Title VII to proscribe discriminatory preference for any one
group); Cunningham, supra note 4, at 444 (stating Title VII "was adopted as an
attempt to address various persistent societal inequities"); Michael J. Zimmer &
Charles A. Sullivan, The Structure of Title VII Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation:
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences of Discrimination, and Burdens of Proof 9
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 30 (1986) (stating Title VII was enacted to address discrim-
ination against African American workers). For a general discussion of employ-
ment discrimination and congressional action prior to the adoption of Title VII,
see generally PAUL BURSTEN, DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE
FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL
13-96 (1998).
In addition to Title VII, a plaintiff, claiming employment discrimination on
the basis of the plaintiff's race may allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1981) (stating persons should have equal rights to
contract within United States); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) (stating citizens have rights
to bring action under federal laws). Section 1981 provides "[a]ll persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens .... " 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section 1981 only covers race or ethnic discrimination, thus a
plaintiff alleging a breach of an employment contract on the basis of his or her
sex, religion or age cannot assert a claim under § 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a)
(stating that minorities have same rights as white citizens). Section 1983 does not
create any rights, but rather is a vehicle for recovering a federal remedy for feder-
ally protected rights, such as those rights protected under § 1981. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (stating persons may bring action for deprivation of rights under federal
laws). Section 1983 states:
5
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employees from being discharged because of their race, religion, sex,
color or national origin.
23
An employer violates Title VII by treating an individual less favorably
than persons who do not possess the individual's protected trait.2 4 An
employer also violates Title VII by implementing a policy that has a dispa-
rate impact on a group of people sharing a protected trait.25 To state a
claim of discriminatory termination successfully under Title VII, the plain-
tiff generally must prove disparate treatment by an employer. 26 Because
Congress did not provide a statutory framework of proof for disparate
treatment cases, the United States Supreme Court developed a framework
in McDonnell Douglas.
27
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, [or]
custom ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in action at law ....
Id.
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting and prima facie elements used in Title
VII cases are also applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims. See ANDREWJ. RuZlCHO ET
AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 2 (1989) (noting Title VII standards
for proving discriminatory treatment are interchangeable with § 1981).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (stating that it is unlawful for employers to dis-
charge employees because of race, sex, religion, color or national origin). In the
past, most litigation involving Title VII attacked discrimination in hiring. See Don-
ohue & Siegelman, supra note 5, at 984 (noting majority of past Title VII litigation
involved discriminatory hiring). Today, however, the overwhelming majority of
Title VII litigation involves discriminatory termination claims. See id. (noting shift
in litigation from discriminatory hiring to discriminatory discharge cases); see also
RuzicHo ET AL., supra note 22, at xv (noting increase in wrongful termination
cases).
24. See RuzlcHo ET AL., supra note 22, at 14 (stating Title VII may be violated
by disparate treatment). The United States Supreme Court defined disparate
treatment in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. See 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977). The Court stated that disparate treatment occurs when "[tihe
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.; see also Cunningham, supra note
4, at 449 (defining disparate treatment); Drew S. Days, III, Reality, 31 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 169, 180 (1994) (same).
25. See RuZICHO ET AL., supra note 22, at 14 (stating Title VII may be violated
by disparate impact). The Supreme Court defined disparate impact in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. See 431 U.S. at 334. The Court stated that
disparate impact involves "employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot
be justified by business necessity." Id.; see also Cunningham, supra note 4, at 449
(defining disparate impact); Days, supra note 24, at 180 (same).
26. See PERRITT, supra note 9, § 2.3 (stating that Title VII plaintiffs usually
prove discrimination using disparate treatment theory); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra
note 6, at 594 (noting overwhelming majority of discriminatory discharge claims
are litigated under disparate treatment theory).
27. See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 450 (stating in McDonnell Douglas Su-
preme Court created series of three shifting-burdens-of-proof for determining
whether plaintiff has suffered employment discrimination in absence of statutory
framework); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (stat-
6
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B. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: Development of the Title VII
Prima Facie Framework
In McDonnell Douglas, the petitioner, McDonnell Douglas Corp., fired
the respondent, a Black male, in an effort to reduce the company's total
number of employees.28 McDonnell Douglas subsequently advertised
available positions for mechanics, the respondent's trade, and the respon-
dent applied for re-employment. 29 After McDonnell Douglas refused to
rehire the respondent, he sued McDonnell Douglas under Title VII, claim-
ing that he had not been rehired because of his race.30
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in McDonnell
Douglas to clarify the proper order and nature of proof in Tide VII individ-
ual disparate treatment cases.3 1 The Court held that a Title VII plaintiff
has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.3 2 A plaintiff may fulfill this burden by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; (iii) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.33
ing in McDonnell Douglas Supreme Court developed order for presentation of
proof in Title VII cases); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252
(1981) (noting Court set up allocations of proof and order of presentation of
proof for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-
04 (creating burden-shifting system for Title VII disparate treatment cases).
28. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794-96 (stating facts of case). Following
the respondent's discharge, the respondent protested that his discharge and Mc-
Donnell Douglas' hiring practices were racially motivated. See id. at 794. The re-
spondent and other protestors illegally stalled cars on the road to McDonnell
Douglas' plant, essentially blocking access to the plant. See id. The respondent
also took part in a "lock-in," in which the respondent and other protestors placed a
chain and padlock on the door to a McDonnell Douglps building, preventing em-
ployees from leaving. See id.
29. See id. at 796.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 798, 800 (noting same). For a further discussion of the Supreme
Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas, see DAvis & GRAHAM, supra note 21, at 240.
32. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Cumpiano v. Banco Santan-
der P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 153 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that Title VII plaintiff has
burden of proving employer discriminated against plaintiff "for a proscribed rea-
son"); Cunningham, supra note 4, at 451 (stating that plaintiffs have initial burden
of establishing prima facie case). In Cumpiano, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
'critical determination in any Title VII suit is whether the complainant has proven
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that an impermissible consideration ...
was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse employment decision." Id. at
155.
33. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added). Courts have inter-
preted the first element, which required the plaintiff to show that he or she is a
racial minority, as requiring the plaintiff to show that he or she belongs to a pro-
tected class. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229
7
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Further, the Court stated that, depending on a particular Title VII
case's fact pattern, the framework might not be applicable. 34 Specifically
developed for plaintiffs who lack direct evidence, the framework allows
plaintiffs to present circumstantial evidence from which the court may in-
fer discrimination. 35
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for
the employee's termination. 36 After the employer fulfills this burden the
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the em-
ployer's offered reasons were actually a pretext for discrimination and not
the employer's true reasons for the plaintiffs discharge. 37
(10th Cir. 2000) (requiring plaintiff to show he or she belongs to protected class
for first prima facie element); Hogan v. Dixon, No. 98-1161, 2000 WL 968054, at *2
(7th Cir. May 25, 2000) (same); Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419,
426 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); Lowry v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., No. 98-1165, 1999
WL 507137, at *2 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (same); see also PERRITr, supra note 9,
§ 2.3 (stating that every person belongs to protected class even if they are not tradi-
tional minority).
34. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 ("The facts necessarily will vary
in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required
from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual
situation."); see also Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (stating Court did not give
guidance for application of framework in other contexts). For a further discussion
of the applicability of the prima facie framework to discriminatory discharge cases,
see infra notes 38-85 and accompanying text.
35. See Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996)
(stating Supreme Court developed McDonnell Douglas framework because plaintiffs
rarely have direct evidence); Cunningham, supra note 4, at 451 (stating Supreme
Court developed prima facie framework for situations where there is no direct
evidence). Examples of direct evidence include a key decisionmaker's pattern of
racial slurs or racist conduct. See RUZICHO ET AL., supra note 22, at 17 (listing exam-
ples of direct evidence). Direct evidence may also include testimony of an em-
ployer or an employer's written policy, which treats employees who possess certain
protected attributes differently than other employees who do not possess the attri-
bute. See Job Discrimination, in 45C Am. JUR. 2D § 2717 (1993) (noting possible ex-
amples of direct evidence in employment discrimination cases). As commentators
have noted, plaintiffs usually depend on circumstantial evidence to show that an
employer discriminated against them because "few discriminators announce their
bias." Ruzici-io ET AL., supra note 22, at 15.
36. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In a later case, Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, the United States Supreme Court refined the burden-
shifting system and stated that the employer does not have to persuade the court
that the employer's actions were motivated by the reasons offered. See Tex. Dep't
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981) (explaining defendant's
burden in employment discrimination cases). Instead, the employer only must
"raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the employer."
Id.
37. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53
(stating plaintiff must demonstrate employer's proffered reason was not true rea-
son for employer's decision). In a later case, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the
United States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons
put forward by the defendant ... may, together with the elements of the prima
facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). This interpretation of the final step in the bur-
[Vol. 46: p. 421
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C. Adaptation of Framework to Discriminatory Discharge Cases
Since the Supreme Court developed the prima facie framework in
McDonnell Douglas, a dispute has arisen in the federal courts over the
proper application of the framework in discriminatory discharge cases. 38
Some commentators believe that this disagreement exists because the Su-
preme Court developed the framework in the context of a discriminatory
hiring case and specifically allowed for flexibility in the application of the
framework. 39 In particular, courts disagree over the interpretation of the
framework's fourth element, in which the Supreme Court required plain-
tiffs in discriminatory hiring cases to show that "the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
[the] complainant's qualifications." 40 In particular, the discrepancy cen-
ters on whether a plaintiff must show non-class replacement to establish a
prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. 4 1 As Justice Souter recog-
den-shifting system, however, has caused much controversy over what the Supreme
Court meant by indicating that disbelief of the employer's reasons may be enough
to prove intentional discrimination. See Chin & Golinsky, supra note 2, at 666 (not-
ing criticism and controversy following Court's decision in Hicks).
38. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 469 (explaining circuit courts varied in
adaptation of prima facie framework to discriminatory discharge cases); see also Job
Discrimination, in 45B AM. JUR. 2D § 1076 (1993) (examining differences in how
courts view necessity of replacement requirement in Title VII prima facie cases).
For a further discussion of the courts' adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work to discriminatory discharge cases, see infra notes 39-85 and accompanying
text.
39. See Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (questioning whether McDonnell Doug-
las framework applies to discriminatory discharge cases); see also Clack-Freeman,
supra note 6, at 469 (stating that circuit courts defined discriminatory discharge
prima facie elements in absence of Supreme Court's guidance). In her article,
Malamud noted the ambiguity created by the Court when it stated that the frame-
work was to be flexible. See Malamud, supra note 7, at 2245 (stating Court did not
address how framework should be applied to Title VII cases). Malamud states:
The Court did not . . . attempt to give any meaningful guidance as to
how the specification of the required prima facie proof would be deter-
mined for cases with other facts-or even any guidance about what it
meant for the "facts" to vary. Was the proof requirement set forth in
McDonnell Douglas to apply to all failure-to-hire cases, with other standards
to apply to cases involving discharges, promotions, and so on? . . . As a
result McDonnell Douglas created a 'prima facie case' with a fixed legal
consequence in litigation but the actual strength of the inferences that
can be drawn from the prima facie case vary depending on the strength
of the evidence that supports it.
Id. at 2245-46.
40. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d
1126, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 1999) (examining other courts' approaches to replace-
ment requirement); Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 354 n.6 (3d Cir.
1999) (noting courts have adopted differing approaches to fourth element); EM.
PLOYMENT, supra note 6, 37, at 115 (noting courts' have differing views of fourth
element in discriminatory discharge cases).
41. Compare Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1998) (modifying
framework to require plaintiff to show replacement outside protected class), with
Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring plaintiff to show em-
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nized in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,42 the Court has never specifically
addressed whether the identity of a plaintiff's replacement is a relevant
consideration in Title VII discriminatory termination cases. 43 Therefore,
the courts have developed varying rules concerning a plaintiff's
replacement.
44
Some courts simply apply the McDonnell Douglas framework without
modifying the fourth element.45 Other circuits, however, require plain-
tiffs to show non-class replacement and will automatically preclude plain-
tiffs from establishing a prima facie case if this burden is not met.46 Still
other circuits list non-class replacement as a required element, but allow
plaintiffs to overcome this requirement by showing additional evidence of
discrimination.
4 7
ployer continued to seek replacement after plaintiffs discharge). Compare Ken-
drick v. Penske Transp. Serv., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating
plaintiffs must show only that position was not eliminated), with Byers v. Dallas
Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating plaintiff who
does not show non-class replacement but provides additional evidence is not pre-
cluded from establishing prima facie case).
42. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
43. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating, "This court
has not directly addressed the question whether the personal characteristics of
someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff are material"); see also Kendrick, 220
F.3d at 1227 (noting Supreme Court has not considered relevancy of plaintiff's
replacements in discriminatory discharge cases); Perry, 199 F.3d at 1136 (recogniz-
ing that Supreme Court has not adopted requirement that plaintiff show replace-
ment was from outside protected class).
44. For a discussion of the federal courts' treatment of the replacement re-
quirement in Title VII discriminatory discharge cases, see infra notes 47-85 and
accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Perry, 199 F.3d at 1139 (noting that requiring plaintiff to show
employer continued to seek applicants is superior standard to those followed in
other courts); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996) (requir-
ing plaintiff to show that replacement continued to perform plaintiff's work after
plaintiff's discharge); Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th
Cir. 1986) (requiring plaintiff to show employer attempted to fill plaintiff's job
with replacement); Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (requiring plaintiff to show employer
sought replacement for plaintiff); see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 470 (stat-
ing that majority of circuits adopted McDonnell Douglas framework without chang-
ing elements); EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 37, at 115 (noting several circuits hold
that establishment of prima facie case does not depend on plaintiff's replace-
ment). For a further discussion of circuits applying the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie elements without alteration, see infra notes 48-68 and accompanying text.
46. See Lowry v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., 98-1165, 1999 WL 507137, at *2
(4th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff to show position filled by person outside pro-
tected class); Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (precluding establishment of prima facie case
because plaintiff failed to show non-class replacement); see also EMPLOYMENr, supra
note 6, 37, at 115 (noting Fourth Circuit requires plaintiff to show non-class
replacement). For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Brown,
see infra notes 100-71 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)
(stating non-class replacement is not necessary); Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co., 218
F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding non-class replacement is not essential to
establish prima facie case); Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1534
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1. Courts Holding Plaintiffs Replacement Irrelevant
The federal courts that have adopted the McDonnell Douglas prima fa-
cie framework without modification do not require plaintiffs to show non-
class replacement.48 Instead, these courts usually require the plaintiff to
show that their position remained open and the employer continued to
seek a replacement.49
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
adopted this approach in Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc.,5°' holding that
a plaintiff does not have to show non-class replacement.5' The Third Cir-
(l1th Cir. 1984) (same); see also EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 37, at 115 (noting
some courts hold that non-class replacement is not necessary if other factors raise
inference of discrimination); Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 473-74 (stating some
courts articulate fourth element as requiring plaintiff to show non-class replace-
ment but noting that these courts do not apply requirement strictly).
48. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 1999) (stat-
ing that most circuits that have addressed the issue have found plaintiff is not re-
quired to prove that plaintiff was replaced by someone outside of protected class);
see, e.g., Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 155 (1st Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing plaintiff can fulfill fourth prong without showing replacement possessed pro-
tected attribute); see also EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 37, at 115 (stating that
several circuits have found that "Title VII case does not hinge on the plaintiffs
replacement coming from outside the protected class").
49. See, e.g., Sengupta, 804 F.2d at 1075 (requiring plaintiff to show "that his
employer sought a replacement with qualifications similar to his own, thus demon-
strating a continued need for the same services and skills"); Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996(requiring plaintiff to show employer continued to seek applicants to fill position);
see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 470 (stating that courts' simply adopting
framework that requires plaintiff to show employer continued to seek replace-
ment); cf. Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996)
(stating plaintiff must prove discharge occurred under circumstances from which
inference of discrimination based on membership in class can be drawn).
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has also held that a
plaintiff must only show that the employer continued to seek applicants to fill the
plaintiffs position. See Smith, 76 F.3d at 421 (stating plaintiff must show that "a
comparably qualified person" continued to perform plaintiffs work after his or
her discharge); Bina v. Providence Coll., 39 F.3d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1994) (agree-
ing with district court's ruling that plaintiff may establish prima facie showing of
discriminatory discharge by showing "position was filled by someone outside the
protected group, or that 'the employer had a continued need for someone to per-
form the same work after [the complainant] left'"); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343,
348 n.7 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting plaintiff must only show employer sought replace-
ment of "roughly equivalent qualifications"); Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 153 (stating
plaintiff must show "employer sought someone of roughly equivalent qualifications
to perform substantially the same work"); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 899
(1st Cir. 1988) (stating plaintiff only must show that "employer sought someone to
perform the same work after he or she left").
50. 191 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 1999).
51. See id., at 357 (holding Title VII plaintiff does not have to show replace-
ment was outside protected class). The Third Circuit reasoned that requiring a
replacement to be outside the plaintiff's protected class would be inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's holding in McDonnell Douglas. See id. at 351 (stating that re-
quiring non-class replacement would not be consistent with Supreme Court's rea-
soning in McDonnell Douglas). The Third Circuit reasoned that if the Supreme
Court believed non-class replacement was essential, the Court would not have re-
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cuit relied, in part, on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.52 In O'Connor, the Supreme
Court found that a plaintiff who alleges age discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") is not required to show non-
class replacement.53 The Supreme Court reasoned that the ADEA pro-
tects individuals from discrimination, not classes of people. 54 Thus, ADEA
plaintiffs must show only that they "lost out" because of their age, not be-
cause of their membership within the ADEA's protected class.55
quired the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas to show that the employer hired a white
person. See id. (finding non-class replacement not required).
52. 517 U.S. 308 (1996). In O'Connor, a fifty-six year-old plaintiff brought an
action under the ADEA, alleging that his employer had discharged him because of
his age and replaced him with a forty-year-old individual. See id. at 309. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that plaintiff had
failed to establish a prima facie case because the employer replaced the plaintiff
with a forty-year-old individual, a person who was within the plaintiffs protected
class under the ADEA. See id. at 310 (discussing disposition of case in Fourth Cir-
cuit). For a discussion of the ADEA, see infra note 53.
53. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 312 (reversing Fourth Circuit's decision and
holding that "the fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the
protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case").
The ADEA protects employees from employment discrimination on the basis of
age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1) (1994). Section 623(a) (1) provides that "[i]t shall
be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."
Id. Although the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, the ADEA
only protects those people who are forty years of age or older. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 631 (a) (1994) ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals
who are at least 40 years of age."). For a further discussion of the ADEA, see gener-
ally Annotation, Construction and Application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq.), 24 A.L.R. FED. 808 (1975).
54. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 312-13 (reasoning that ADEA protects persons
not classes).
55. See id. at 312 (rejecting consideration of plaintiffs replacement in ADEA
cases). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor, the federal courts were
sharply divided over whether a plaintiff in an age discrimination case had to show
that his or her replacement was from outside of the plaintiff's protected class. See
Guy D. Chappel III, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.: Broadening the
Scope of Age Discrimination Claims Under the ADEA, 20 AM. J. TRIAL Anvoc. 211, 211-
12 (1996) (recognizing circuit split over whether plaintiff alleging age discrimina-
tion had to show replacement was under age forty); see also Bernard Mower, Age
Discrimination: Supreme Court Agrees to Clarify Age Discrimination Elements of Proof 1995
DAILY LAB. REP. 219 (noting Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether ADEA plaintiff must show non-class replacement). The Court, however,
clarified that the ADEA prohibits age discrimination and does not prohibit dis-
crimination against employees who are aged forty and older. See O'Connor, 517
U.S. at 312 (reasoning plaintiff's replacement is irrelevant). In particular, the
Court stated "[t] he fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to an-
other person in the protected class is . . . irrelevant, so long as he has lost out
because of his age." Id.
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The Third Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning in
O'Connor and found that the reasoning applied equally to Tide VII cases.
56
In addition, the Third Circuit stated that an employer may treat a female
employee differently than similarly situated male employees, but may still
replace the female employee with another female.5 7 Furthermore, the
Third Circuit reasoned that an employer might hire someone from within
the plaintiffs protected class to avoid a discrimination suit.
58
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also simply
adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework for discriminatory discharge
cases. 59 In Meiri v. Dacon,60 the Second Circuit reasoned that requiring a
plaintiff to show non-class replacement was "at odds with the policies un-
derlying Title VII." 6 1 Subsequently, the Second Circuit has defined the
fourth element even more liberally, requiring the plaintiff to show "that
his discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of dis-
crimination on the basis of his membership in that class."
62
56. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 354-55 (finding guidance in O'Connor decision).
The Third Circuit analogized Pivirotto's case to O'Connor and found that as long as
the plaintiff "loses out" because of his or her protected attribute, the plaintiff's
replacement is irrelevant. See id. at 355 (analogizing case to O'Connor).
57. See id. at 353-54 (noting that replacement from within protected class does
not necessarily mean plaintiff was not treated differently from employees from
outside plaintiffs protected class). The Third Circuit reasoned that employers
may discharge an employee due to gender-based stereotypes. See id. at 355 (noting
employer may fire women who are too aggressive but may not fire men who are
aggressive).
58. See id. (noting some employers may hire individual from within protected
class to defeat discrimination suit); accord Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726
F.2d 1529, 1535 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting employer may have hired same class re-
placement to avoid suit).
59. See Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1985) (adopting McDonnell
Douglas framework without modification for discriminatory discharge cases). In
Meiri, the Second Circuit stated "the appropriate inquiry should be whether the
employer continued to seek applicants to fill the position." Id. at 995; cf
Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding prima
facie case may be established in variety of ways). In Chertkova, the Second Circuit
stated that a plaintiff may fulfill the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work by showing the employer continued to seek applicants to fulfill the position
or by showing that "preferential treatment [was] given to employees outside the
protected class" or by presenting "actions or remarks made by decision makers that
could be viewed as reflecting a discriminatory animus." Id. For a discussion of the
Second Circuit's subsequent interpretation of the fourth prong, see infra notes 61-
62 and accompanying text.
60. 759 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1985).
61. Id. at 996. The Meiri court stated that the McDonnell Douglas elements of
proof "were not intended to be 'rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.' Rather, they
were intended only to promote the general principle that a Title VII plaintiff must
carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to 'raise[ ] an inference of
discrimination.' Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
62. Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). The
Second Circuit stated that a plaintiff could raise an inference of discrimination
under the fourth prong by showing: (1) the employer continued to seek applicants
2001] NOTE 433
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in its most recent case addressing the issue, Kendrick v.
Penske Transportation Services, Inc.6 3 In Kendrick, the Tenth Circuit found
that a plaintiff must show only that the employer did not eliminate the
plaintiffs position after the plaintiffs termination. 64 To reach this con-
clusion, the Tenth Circuit relied on its reasoning in Perry v. Woodward.65
In Perry, the Tenth Circuit explicitly rejected consideration of a plaintiff's
for the plaintiff's position; (2) the employer criticized the plaintiffs performance
in ethnically degrading terms; (3) the employer made "invidious comments about
others in the employee's protected group;" (4) the employer treated non-group
members more favorably; (5) the sequence of events leading to the discharge was
discriminatory; or (6) the timing of the discharge was discriminatory. Id. This
interpretation of the fourth element appears to be controlling precedent within
the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Chertkova, 92 F.3d at 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that
under fourth element plaintiff must show discharge occurred under circumstances
giving rise to inference of discrimination); McKeever v. N.Y. Medical Coll., No. 96-
7066, 1999 WL 179376, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) (same); Badrinauth v. Drey-
fus Serv. Corp., No. 96-2016, 1998 WL 813412, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1998)
(same); Ivaniuc v. Hauer Knitting Mills, Inc., No. 94-5909, 1998 WL 57077, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1998) (same); Pappy v. S. Beach Psych. Ctr., No. 92-CV-5565,
1996 WL 1088901, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1996) (same); Cianfrano v. Babbitt, 851
F. Supp. 41, 45 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1994) (same). But see Budde v. H&K Distrib.
Co., No. 99-9449, 2000 WL 900204, at *1 (2d Cir. June 29, 2000) (listing fourth
element as requiring plaintiff to show that person not in protected class replaced
plaintiff although element was not at issue); Lawson v. Getty Terminals Corp., 866
F. Supp. 793, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating plaintiff may satisfy fourth element by
showing that individuals from outside protected class either replaced plaintiff or
were retained when plaintiff was terminated); see also Chin & Golinsky, supra note
2, at 663-64 ("Today, most Second Circuit decisions frame the fourth element as
requiring the plaintiff to have suffered the adverse employment action under cir-
cumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.").
63. 220 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000).
64. See id. at 1227 (stating plaintiffs must show position was not eliminated).
Before reaching this conclusion, the court examined Tenth Circuit precedent,
which addressed the issue of a plaintiffs replacement. See id. at 1227-29 (address-
ing Tenth Circuit precedent). The court noted that early holdings did not require
the plaintiff to show non-class replacement. See id. at 1227 (same). The court also
noted that some Tenth Circuit decisions listed the fourth prong as requiring the
plaintiff to show that the plaintiffs replacement was of non-protected status. See id.
at 1228 (recognizing different standard applied in some cases). The Tenth Circuit
distinguished these decisions as dicta and, thus, not controlling precedent within
the circuit. See id. at 1228 (characterizing requirement as dicta). The Tenth Cir-
cuit, however, did not address or distinguish its recent holding in Toth v. Gates
Rubber Co., No. 99-1017, 2000 WL 796068 (10th Cir. July 21, 2000). In Toth, the
Tenth Circuit stated that a plaintiff may fulfill the fourth prong of McDonnell Doug-
las by showing: (1) treatment which was less favorable than treatment afforded to
similarly situated employees; (2) replacement by someone outside the protected
class; or (3) the position was not eliminated. See id. at *7 & n.7 (listing require-
ments for fourth prong). The Toth court, however, found that the Yugoslavian
plaintiff, who had alleged that her employer discharged her based on her national
origin and/or gender, had established a prima facie showing of discriminatory
discharge because her employer replaced her with an Anglo male. See id. at *5, *7
(stating plaintiff's allegations and finding plaintiff satisfied fourth element by
showing she was replaced with Anglo male).
65. 199 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 1999).
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replacement as unfairly precluding suits by plaintiffs who may have legiti-
mate claims. 66 The Tenth Circuit also rejected another common ap-
proach that requires plaintiffs to present additional evidence that leads to
an inference of discrimination. 67 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that this
approach resulted in too much uncertainty for the district courts and for
the parties.
68
2. Non-Class Replacement Is Not Essential if Additional Evidence Is Present
Several federal courts list non-class replacement as an essential ele-
ment of the framework, but have held that a plaintiff's failure to show non-
class replacement does not automatically preclude establishment of a
prima facie case.69 Instead, these courts consider additional evidence
66. See id. at 1137 (stating strict replacement requirement would preclude
meritorious suits). The Tenth Circuit reasoned that an inflexible rule would
preclude suits against employers who hire and fire minority employees in
an attempt to prevent them from vesting in employment benefits or de-
veloping a track record to qualify for promotion . . . [and] would also
preclude a suit against an employer who terminates a woman it negatively
perceives as a 'feminist' and replaces her with a woman who is willing to
be subordinate to her male co-workers or replaces an African-American
with an African-American who is perceived to 'know his place.'
Id.
67. See id. at 1139 (finding that approach requiring plaintiffs to present addi-
tional evidence of discrimination is inferior). For a further discussion of this ap-
proach, which requires additional evidence of discrimination when replacement is
from the same class as the plaintiff, see infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
68. See Perry, 199 U.S. at 1139 (finding requirement of additional evidence is
too uncertain). The Tenth Circuit noted that courts adopting this approach have
not explained what types of additional evidence would be sufficient to raise an
inference of discrimination. See id. (noting courts have not provided examples of
sufficient evidence). The Tenth Circuit found that this lack of guidance created
too much uncertainty. See id. (rejecting requirement of additional evidence).
69. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 473-74 (stating that some courts articu-
late fourth element as requiring plaintiff to show outside replacement but do not
strictly enforce this element); see, e.g., Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d
157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating plaintiff may be able to show discharge was
result of protected attribute although employer hired same class replacement).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted this ap-
proach. See Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000) (stat-
ing replacement with non-member of protected class is not essential to
establishment of discriminatory discharge prima facie case); Byers v. Dallas Morn-
ing News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that replacement
with member of same protected class is outcome-determinative if plaintiff does not
present other evidence of discriminatory intent); Nieto v. L&H Packaging Co., 108
F.3d 621, 624 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that replacement with member of same
protected class does not preclude establishment of prima facie case of Title VII
discriminatory discharge); Byrd v. Roadway Express, Inc., 687 F.2d 85, 86 (5th Cir.
1982) (noting that replacement by member of protected class does not negate
possibility that discharge was motivated by discrimination);Jones v. W. Geophysical
Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating replacement of a minority
employee with non-minority is not only way to create inference of discriminatory
intent); Marks v. Prattco, Inc., 607 F.2d 1153, 1155 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding black
employees established prima facie case of discriminatory termination because em-
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from which discriminatory intent can be inferred.711
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted
this approach in Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.7 1 The court reasoned that
the ultimate question in discriminatory discharge cases is "whether the
plaintiff has established a logical reason to believe that the decision rests
on a legally forbidden ground."72 Thus, the court held that the fact that a
plaintiff's replacement is of "another race, sex, or age" may raise an infer-
ployer replaced plaintiffs with white employees); see also Clack-Freeman, supra note
6, at 473-76 (noting Fifth Circuit does not preclude establishment of prima facie
when plaintiff was replaced by member of plaintiffs protected class). But see Singh
v. Shoney's, Inc., 64 F.3d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding white female failed to
establish prima facie case of discriminatory discharge based on race because white
female replaced her); Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating
plaintiff must show that other employees who were non-members of plaintiffs pro-
tected class remained in similar positions).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also appears to
have adopted this interpretation. See Davenport v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist., 30
F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating plaintiff must demonstrate that discharge
occurred in circumstances which allow court to infer discrimination); Walker v. St.
Anthony's Med. Ctr., 881 F.2d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). In Walker, the
Eighth Circuit stated that plaintiffs who are replaced by members of their pro-
tected class may still be able to establish that that they were the "object[s] of imper-
missible discrimination." Id. The Eighth Circuit further reasoned that "the sex of
[the plaintiffs] replacement, although a relevant consideration, is not necessarily
a determinative factor in answer to either the initial inquiry of whether she estab-
lished a prima facie case or the ultimate inquiry of whether she was the victim of
discrimination." Id.
70. See EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6, 37, at 115 (stating that plaintiff's replace-
ment is "a fact that must be considered in determining whether the claimant's
ultimate burden of persuasion of intentional discrimination has been sustained,
rather than whether a prima facie case has been established"); Clack-Freeman,
supra note 6, at 478 (stating that these circuits consider the plaintiffs replacement
in plaintiff's "overall attempt to prove discriminatory intent"); see also Perry, 199
F.3d at 1139 (stating that some circuits allow a plaintiff to establish prima facie if
additional facts are shown from which inference of discrimination can be shown).
71. 82 F.3d 157 (7th Cir. 1996).
72. Id. at 159. The Seventh Circuit further stated that "[a]n employee may be
able to show that his race or another characteristic that the law places off limits
tipped the scales against him, without regard to the demographic characteristics of
his replacement." Jd. at 158-59. In reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit
relied on the Court's decision in O'Connor. See id. (examining O'Connor). The
Seventh Circuit found that the Supreme Court's reasoning that "laws against dis-
crimination protect persons, not classes" is equally applicable to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. The Seventh Circuit utilized a hypothetical situation to demon-
strate O'Connor's applicability in Title VII cases:
Suppose an employer evaluates its staff yearly and retains black workers
who are in the top quarter of its labor force, but keeps any white in the
top half. A black employee ranked in the 60th percentile of the staff
according to supervisors' evaluations is let go, while all white employees
similarly situated are retained. This is race discrimination, which the em-
ployer cannot purge by hiring another person of the same race later.
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ence of discrimination, but non-class replacement is "neither sufficient or
necessary."
73
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also has
held that a same-class replacement does not automatically preclude a
plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case.7 4 The Eleventh Circuit origi-
nally adopted this approach in a discriminatory hiring case, Howard v.
Roadway Express, Inc.7 5 In Howard, Roadway Express refused to hire the
plaintiff, a black man and former part-time employee of the company, for
permanent employment. 76 The following year, Roadway Express hired a
black man to fill the position for which the plaintiff had applied.77 The
Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff was not precluded from establish-
ing a prima facie case, reasoning that plaintiffs can raise an inference of
discrimination in other ways.7 8 The Howard court indicated that there
might be an inference of discrimination because of a substantial lapse of
time between the plaintiff's application and the subsequent hiring.79 In
addition, the Howard court stated that because Roadway hired a same-class
replacement after the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Commission, the hiring could have been motivated by
the filing of the complaint, and thus, discrimination could still be
inferred.8 0
3. Courts Considering Non-Class Replacement an Essential Element
A small minority of federal courts have adopted a strict approach to
the consideration of a plaintiffs replacement identity.8 1 In these courts,
the plaintiff is automatically precluded from establishing a prima facie
73. Id. at 519; see also Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 481, 485 (5th
Cir. 2000) ("[It is well settled that, although replacement with a non-member of
the protected class is evidence of discriminatory intent, it is not essential to the
establishment of a prima facie case under Title VII.").
74. See, e.g., Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir.
1995) (stating plaintiff must show replacement outside protected class under
fourth element but finding "prima facie case is not wholly dependant upon meet-
ing the fourth requirement of the McDonnell Douglas test").
75. 726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984).
76. See id., at 1534 (describing facts of case).
77. See id.
78. See id. ("[P]roof that the employer replaced the fired minority employee
with a non-minority employee is not the only way to create such an inference [of
unlawful discrimination]." (quoting Jones v. Western Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d
280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982))).
79. See Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535 (noting "the lapse of eleven months would
significantly diminish the reliability of the subsequent hiring as an indicator of
Roadway Express' intent at the time it rejected [the plaintiff's] application").
80. See id. (stating inference of discrimination cannot be ruled out based on
circumstances of case).
81. See, e.g., Lowry v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., No. 98-1165, 1999 WL 507137,
at *2 (4th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiff to show position filled by person outside
protected class); Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1998) (precluding
establishment of prima facie case because plaintiff failed to show non-class replace-
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case of discriminatory termination if the plaintiff fails to show that his or
her replacement is from outside of the plaintiff's protected class.8 2 The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia adopted this rea-
soning in Klein v. Derwinski.8 3 In that case, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia stated that an employee alleging discrimina-
tory discharge must show that a person from outside the employee's pro-
tected class filled the employee's position, or that an employee from
outside the protected class with comparable experience was not termi-
nated.8 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
adopted a similar requirement in Brown v. McLean.
8 5
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY or BROWN V. McLEAN
According to the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Brown, the plaintiff, Ron-
ald A. Brown, a white male, was employed as the City of Baltimore's Ad-
ministrator of Telephone Facilities. 8 6 On December 3, 1991,Jacqueline F.
McLean, a black female, took office as the City of Baltimore's Comptroller
and Brown's supervisor. 87 Upon taking office, McLean criticized the lack
ment); Klein v. Derwinski, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) (requiring plaintiff to
show non-class replacement).
82. See, e.g., Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (stating that plaintiff failed to establish
prima facie case because plaintiff could not show non-class replacement); Lowry,
1999 WL 507137, at *2 (finding that plaintiff did not establish prima facie case
because plaintiff failed to show non-class replacement); see also Clack-Freeman,
supra note 6, at 479-80 (stating that in United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, plaintiffs who fail to show non-class replacement are precluded from
establishing prima facie case).
83. 869 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1994).
84. See id. at 4 (stating criteria for establishing prima facie case of religious
discrimination). In Klein, a Jewish employee alleged that her employer, the De-
partment of Veteran Affairs, had terminated her based on her religion. See id. at
5-8. The court noted that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case had been
adapted for use in discriminatory termination cases and stated that under the
fourth prong of the framework the plaintiff must prove that "she was either re-
placed by a person not in the protected class, or such a person with comparable
qualifications and work records was not terminated." Id. at 7; see also Simens v.
Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding plaintiff must show replacement
outside protected class in disparate treatment cases). After the plaintiffs dis-
charge, another Jewish employee took over the responsibilities of the plaintiff's
position; thus the court found that the plaintiff failed to show that someone
outside of her protected class filled the position. See Klein, 869 F. Supp. at 8 (find-
ing plaintiff did not meet her burden under McDonnell Douglas prima facie frame-
work). In addition, the court noted that the plaintiff had failed to allege that her
employer had refused to fire a non-Jewish person who held a similar position as
the plaintiff and who had a similar work performance as the plaintiff. See id. at 8-10
(same).
85. For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Brown, see infra
notes 100-71 and accompanying text.
86. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 900 (stating facts of case). As the Administrator of
Telephone Facilities, Brown was responsible for directing the city government's
telephone services. See id.
87. See id.
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of diversity in the office.8 8 In particular, McLean complained that the of-
fice portraits were exclusively of white males and had the portraits re-
moved from the office.
89
On December 18, 1991, McLean's transition team issued a report sug-
gesting that the municipal post office and telephone department be com-
bined into one department under one manager's supervision.90 McLean
sent the recommendation to Baltimore's Board of Estimates, of which Mc-
Lean was a voting member.9 1 On May 13, 1992, the Board of Estimates
issued its budget recommendations, which included eliminating Brown's
position and adding a new position: the Director of Communications
Services. 92
On May 24, 1992, Brown received a letter from McLean, informing
him that his position was being eliminated. 93 On July 1, 1992, Rochelle
Young, a black man, was provisionally appointed and, subsequently perma-
nently hired, to fill the newly created Director of Communications Ser-
vices position. 94
On February 7, 1995, Brown filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland against McLean, the Mayor and the City
of Baltimore under Title VII. 95 Brown claimed that his position had been
88. See id. (stating facts of case).
89. See id.
90. See id. (noting transition team's recommendations). The report stated
that "the restructuring would 'use present personnel on board' and [would] 'take
maximum advantage of proven personnel capabilities.'" Id. at 901.
91. See id. at 901.
92. See id.
93. See id. The letter stated that the elimination of Brown's position was not
Brown's fault and stated that the position was being eliminated based on McLean's
transition team's recommendations. See id. (noting contents of termination
letter).
94. See id. (stating Young was provisionally appointed to newly created posi-
tion and began working in Brown's old office). Prior to Brown's departure, Brown
met with McLean for an exit interview, during which time Brown told McLean that
he was going to apply for the Director of Communications Services position. See id.
The Baltimore City Regulations require that any person, whose position is abol-
ished, be placed on a re-employment list for a position that "most nearly approxi-
mate[s] the position abolished." Id. Under the Baltimore City Regulations, a
person on the re-employment list takes priority over any other person who may
apply for the position. See id. (describing city regulations). Brown, however, was
not placed on the list for the Director of Communications Services position. See id.
(stating there is conflicting evidence about why Brown was not placed on re-em-
ployment list for Director of Communications Services position). Instead, Brown
was placed on the re-employment list for the position of Telephone Supervisor, for
which there was no vacancy. See id. The Telephone Supervisor is a working tele-
phone operator, which requires a high school education, Whereas Brown had an
M.B.A. and no experience as a switchboard operator. See id. The Director of Com-
munications Services position was advertised in the newspaper, but Brown never
applied for the position. See id. (stating there was open application process for
position).
95. See id. at 898, 901 (recounting disposition of case).
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eliminated and he had been discharged because of his gender.9 6 The dis-
trict court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on
Brown's claim of discriminatory discharge based on gender.9 7 The district
court reasoned that because a male filled the Director of Communications
Services position, Brown had not been a victim of gender discrimination.
98
Brown appealed the court's decision and requested that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit find that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment against him on his gender discrimi-
nation charge.9 9
96. See id. at 898, 901 (noting claims in district court). Brown also alleged a
violation of his equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, as well
as race discrimination under Title VII. See id. at 901. The district court also
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of unlawful
discrimination in the elimination of Brown's position. See id. 901-02. The court
refused to grant summary judgment on Brown's failure to hire claim, finding that
there was a genuine question of material fact that Brown was not hired because of
his race. See id. The court denied Brown's motion for summary judgment in
which Brown had argued that the city's affirmative action claim constituted a race
and gender based employment policy in violation of Title VII and the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. The case went to trial on Brown's Title VII failure-to-hire
claim and on Brown's § 1981 and § 1983 claims against the city. See id. at 902. The
court granted the city's motion forjudgment as a matter of law, finding that Brown
had not produced sufficient evidence that there was a violation of § 1981 and
§ 1983, and that Brown did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.
See id.
97. See id. at 901-02 (noting disposition of case in district court). The defend-
ants also claimed that the plaintiff had not been unlawfully discriminated against
by the elimination of his position as the Administrator of Telephone Facilities. See
id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
this claim. See id. The defendants also claimed that they were entitled to summary
judgment based on the plaintiffs inability to show that he was not hired for the
Director of Communications Services because of his race. See id. The district court
refused to grant summary judgment on this claim, finding that the plaintiff had
established a genuine issue of material fact that he was not hired for the position
because of his race. See id. (noting district court's ruling on failure to re-hire
claim).
98. See id. (recounting district court's reasoning).
99. See id. at 905 (noting basis for appeal). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit also
affirmed the district court's finding that Brown had not established a prima facie
case of failure-to-hire and affirmed the denial of partial summary judgment on
Brown's claim that the city's affirmative action plan constituted a race or gender-
based employment policy. See id. (noting circuit ruling). The dissent, however,
argued that the district court's grant of summary judgment on Brown's Title VII
race discrimination claim should be reversed. See id. at 906. In support of its argu-
ment, the dissent provided additional evidence indicating discrimination, further
noting that by the time McLean left office there were no Caucasians and only one
male working in the Comptroller's office. See id. at 906-08 (stating additional
facts).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING IN BROWN V. McLEAN
A. Narrative Analysis
1. Requiring Replacement Outside Protected Class
The Fourth Circuit initiated review of Brown's gender discrimination
claim by stating that "[i]n order to make out a prima facie case of discrimi-
natory termination, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the position was
ultimately filled by someone not a member of the protected class." l ° °l In
reaching this proposition, the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Hicks, as well as the district court's decision in Klein, as examples of cases
in which courts required plaintiffs to show non-class replacements."0 '
2. The Fourth Circuit Notes There Are Exceptions
The Fourth Circuit, however, noted that there were three distinct ex-
ceptions to the non-class requirement. 10 2 First, the court listed the Su-
preme Court's decision in O'Connor as an exception.10 3 The Fourth
Circuit stated that age discrimination cases like O'Connor, in which an em-
ployer replaces the plaintiff with a significantly younger person from
within the plaintiff's protected class are exceptions to the replacement re-
quirement. 10 4 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not address this excep-
tion in its analysis of Brown's claim.10 5
The second exception the Fourth Circuit discussed was cases in which
there has been a significant length of time between the plaintiff's applica-
tion for employment and the employer's hiring of another individual
within the same protected class. 1° 6 In support of this exception, the
Fourth Circuit noted the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Howard, in which
the Eleventh Circuit stated that a significant period of time between the
employer's rejection of the plaintiff and the employer's subsequent hiring
of a same-class replacement does not eliminate an inference of discrimina-
100. Id. at 905.
101. See id. at 905 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506
(1993); Klein v. Derwinski, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1994)).
102. See id. at 905 (stating that courts have noted exceptions in limited situa-
tions). In Hicks, the Supreme Court noted that the petitioners were not challeng-
ing the district court's finding that the respondent established a prima facie
showing by proving that a white man ultimately filled the respondent's position.
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (stating that establish-
ment of prima facie case was not being questioned).
103. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (citing O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp.,
517 U.S. 308 (1996) (listing exceptions to non-class requirement)).
104. See id. at 905 (stating that courts may find exceptions where employers
replace plaintiffs with younger persons within same class).
105. See id. at 906 (finding none of exceptions were applicable and beginning
analysis with second exception).
106. See id. (finding that significant lapse of time between application and
rehiring decision would create exception to non-class replacement requirement).
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tion.107 In addressing this exception, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
even if Brown had applied for the Director of Communications Services
position, the length of time between Brown's application and the city's
hiring of another male would not have been significant enough to place
Brown within the second exception.10 8
The final exception that the Fourth Circuit noted was an employer's
hiring of a same-class replacement that is intended to mask the employer's
discrimination against the plaintiff.10 9 The Fourth Circuit examined this
exception and found that Brown had not presented any evidence that in-
dicated that the city intended to disguise gender discrimination against
Brown by hiring another male. 110 Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that
Brown failed to establish a prima facie showing of discriminatory dis-
charge and affirmed the district court's grant of motion for summary
judgment.' 1 '
B. Critical Analysis
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Brown is inconsistent with the conclu-
sions reached by all other federal circuit courts that have addressed the
issue.1 12 The court's inconsistent holding may stem from the manner in
which the court analyzed Brown's claim. 113 The court set forth a rule stat-
ing that the plaintiff must show his employer hired a non-class replace-
107. See id. (citing Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir.
1984)). For a further discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Howard, see
supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
108. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 906 ("Even if Brown had applied for the DCS posi-
tion, the city hired another male for the position at the same time that Brown
would have been considered for the position.").
109. See id. at 905 (noting an exception to non-class replacement requirement
is created "where the employer's hiring of another person within the protected
class is calculated to disguise its act of discrimination toward the plaintiff').
110. See id. at 906 (stating that evidence presented was not sufficient to estab-
lish that city was attempting to mask discrimination by hiring another male).
111. See id. at 906.
112. Compare Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (requiring plaintiff to show non-class re-
placement), with Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000)
(finding non-class replacement is not essential to establish prima facie case), Car-
son v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating non-class
replacement is not necessary), Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st
Cir. 1996) (requiring plaintiff to simply show replacement continued to perform
plaintiff's work after plaintiff's discharge), Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804
F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring plaintiffs to show simply that employer
sought replacement for plaintiff), Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1985)
(requiring plaintiffs to show employer sought replacement for plaintiff), and How-
ard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding non-
class replacement is not necessary).
113. For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Brown, see
infra notes 118-71 and accompanying text.
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ment and then listed three exceptions to the rule.11 4 Although the court
cited specific cases to support the rule and its exceptions, the court did
not analyze the reasoning in these cases.1 15 In addition, unlike other fed-
eral circuit courts, the Fourth Circuit did not address the purpose of Title
VII and the purpose of the prima facie case. 1 16 As a result, the court
reached an inconsistent result.1 17
1. Development of Non-Class Replacement Requirement Rests on Possibly
Flawed Reasoning
The Fourth Circuit erroneously cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Hicks as providing the applicable law for interpretation of the fourth ele-
ment of the prima facie framework. 118 In particular, the Fourth Circuit
cited Hicks as requiring Title VII plaintiffs to show non-class replace-
ment.119 The Supreme Court in Hicks, however, did not address whether
a plaintiff must show non-class replacement because the plaintiff's estab-
lishment of a prima facie case was not at issue in Hicks.120 In fact, the
dissent in Hicks expressly stated that the Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed the relevancy of a plaintiffs replacement in the context of a dis-
criminatory discharge case.12 1 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on
114. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (stating that plaintiff must show non-class re-
placement to establish prima facie case and stating that there are three exceptions
to the requirement).
115. See id. at 905-06 (citing other federal circuit cases as examples of Fourth
Circuit's list of exceptions, but not analyzing reasoning of these cases).
116. See id. at 905-06 (failing to address underlying policy and purpose of
prima facie case and of Title VII). Federal circuit courts that have addressed the
purposes of Title VII and of the Title VII prima facie cases have adopted more
lenient approaches than the Fourth Circuit's strict non-class replacement require-
ment. See, e.g., Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (noting purpose of Title VII and prima facie
case and adopting McDonnell Douglas framework in its original form). In Meiri, the
Second Circuit stated that the non-class replacement requirement was "at odds
with the policies underlying Title VII." Id. The court further noted the flexibility
of the prima facie elements. See id. (stating that prima facie elements were not
intended to be applied rigidly).
117. For a further discussion of the inconsistency of the Fourth Circuit's hold-
ing, see infra notes 118-71 and accompanying text.
118. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 ("In order to make out a prima facie case of
discriminatory termination, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the position ulti-
mately was filled by someone not a member of the protected class." (citing St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993))).
119. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (citing Hicks as requiring plaintiff to show non-
class replacement requirement).
120. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. V. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (stating
"[p]etitioners do not challenge the District Court's finding that respondent satis-
fied the minimal requirements of such a prima facie case"). After noting that the
plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case was not at issue, the Court proceeded
to quote the district court's prima facie elements. See id. In the district court's
opinion, it stated the fourth element as "the position remained open and was ulti-
mately filled by a white man." Id.
121. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528 n.1 (1993) (SouterJ., dissenting) ("This court
has not directly addressed the question whether the personal characteristics of
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Hicks resulted in the application of an improper standard to Brown's dis-
criminatory discharge claim122
The Fourth Circuit also cited the district court's holding in Klein as
supporting the replacement requirement. 123 Although the district court
did hold that a plaintiff must show non-class replacement, the court's
holding directly conflicts with the approaches adopted by all federal cir-
cuit courts of appeal that have addressed the issue. 124 For example, some
federal courts-including the Second, Tenth and Third Circuits-do not
look at a plaintiffs replacement, but instead require a plaintiff to show
either that the employer continued to seek a replacement for the plaintiff,
or that the discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference
of discrimination.1 25 Other circuits that have addressed the issue do con-
sider a plaintiff's replacement, but unlike the Klein court, these circuit
courts do not preclude a plaintiff who fails to show non-class replacement
from establishing a prima facie case if the plaintiff can provide other evi-
dence of discrimination. 12 6 Thus, although the Fourth Circuit correctly
cited Klein as imposing a strict replacement requirement on Title VII
plaintiffs attempting to establish a prima facie case of discrimination re-
sulting from their termination, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Klein
caused the court to adopt an approach that varies from the approaches
adopted by all other circuit courts.1 2
7
someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff are material, and this issue is not
before us today.").
122. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's erroneous reliance on Hicks, see
supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
123. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (citing Klein in support of non-class replace-
ment requirement).
124. Compare Klein v. Derwinski, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) (requiring
plaintiff to show non-class replacement), and Simens v. Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 8
(D.D.C. 1997) (same), with Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv. Corp., 220 F.3d 1220,
1228 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding plaintiff must show employer did not eliminate
position after plaintiffs discharge), Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d
148, 153 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding plaintiff must show only employer sought replace-
ment), and Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing replacement requirement is "inconsistent with Title VII").
125. See, e.g., Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1229 (stating plaintiff must raise inference
of discrimination to establish prima facie case of discriminatory discharge);
Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 356 (requiring plaintiff to show circumstances that give rise to
inference of discrimination in order to establish prima facie case of discriminatory
discharge); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring plaintiffs
to show employer sought replacement for plaintiff).
126. See, e.g., Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426-27 (5th
Cir. 2000) (holding that same-class replacement is outcome-determinative if plain-
tiff does not present other evidence of discriminatory intent); Carson v.
Bethelehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating plaintiff may be
able to show that discharge was result of protected attribute although employer
hired same-class replacement); Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529,
1534 (stating that non-class replacement is not only way to establish prima facie
case).
127. See Klein, 869 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1994) (requiring plaintiff to show
non-class replacement to establish prima facie case). But see Clack-Freeman, supra
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2. Misapplied Reasoning Leads to Flawed List of Exceptions
Another example of the Fourth Circuit's misguidance is its interpreta-
tion of the list of exceptions. 128 First, the court incorrectly applied the
Supreme Court's O'Connor decision as a unique exception for age discrimi-
nation cases. 129 Because the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor in-
volved the ADEA, not Title VII, other circuit courts that have examined
the decision in the context of Title VII do not view it as an exception to
the replacement requirement.1 30 Instead, many federal courts rely on the
decision as supporting the proposition that Title VII protects individuals
from discrimination, but does not protect classes of people from discrimi-
nation.1 31 Thus, these courts rely on O'Connor in arguing that a plaintiff s
replacement should not be the sole criteria in determining whether a
plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of discriminatory termina-
tion.' 32 For example, the Third Circuit in Pivirotto argued that the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in O'Connor applied equally to Title VII and
stated that a Title VII plaintiff must show that he or she "lost out" because
of a protected trait.' 3 3 Additionally, in Carson, the Seventh Circuit relied
note 6, at 469 (stating most courts either simply adopted McDonnell Douglas frame-
work or do not strictly enforce non-class replacement requirement); see also Perry,
199 F.3d at 1138-39 (summarizing circuits' adoption of lenient approach to re-
placement requirement). In examining other circuits' approaches to the replace-
ment requirement the Tenth Circuit found:
Several circuits ... have held that a plaintiff can satisfy the prima facie
burden without proving that the position was filled by an individual who
does not share the protected attribute. Some circuits have concluded
only that a plaintiff is not precluded from meeting the prima facie bur-
den by an inability to demonstrate that the replacement employee does
not share [his or] her protected attribute.
Id.
128. For a critique of the Fourth Circuit's list exceptions, see infra notes 129-
59 and accompanying text.
129. See Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 9th Cir. 1998) (citing O'Connor
as example of age discrimination exception).
130. See, e.g., Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (examining O'Connor decision and us-
ing it to support argument in Title VII discriminatory discharge case); Carson, 82
F.3d at 158 (same).
131. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (stating O'Connor reasoning applies in gen-
der and race context); Carson, 82 F.3d at 158 (stating discrimination laws protect
people not classes).
132. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (stating that Supreme Court's reasoning "ap-
plies equally in gender or race context: 'The fact that one person in the protected
class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant [to the
prima facie case], so long as [s]he has lost out because of [her gender]"' (quoting
O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996))); Carson, 82 F.3d
at 158 (stating that Supreme Court's reasoning is equally applicable to Title VII
discriminatory discharge cases).
133. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (rejecting non-class replacement require-
ment after examining and adopting O'Connor reasoning). The Third Circuit
found that proof of discrimination should not be limited to fact that plaintiff was
or was not replaced by someone from outside his or her protected class. See id.
(rejecting strict non-class replacement requirement).
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on the Supreme Court's reasoning that "[l]aws against discrimination pro-
tect persons, not classes" to find that Title VII plaintiffs are not required to
show non-class replacement.
1 34
If the Fourth Circuit had applied the Supreme Court's reasoning as
the Third Circuit did in Pivirotto or as the Seventh Circuit did in Carson,
the Fourth Circuit may have held that a plaintiff's replacement is an irrele-
vant consideration in the establishment of a prima facie case of discrimina-
tory discharge. 135 Because the Fourth Circuit classified O'Connor as an
exception to the replacement requirement for ADEA cases, its reasoning is
inconsistent with the reasoning of courts that have addressed the same
issue. 136 As a result, the Fourth Circuit has made it more difficult for
plaintiffs in the Fourth Circuit to overcome a motion for summary
judgment.1 3 7
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's classification of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Howard is also flawed.' 38 The Eleventh Circuit in Howard
adopted the requirement that the plaintiff must show only "circumstances
which give rise to an inference of discrimination."' 3 9 Once the Eleventh
Circuit found the plaintiff had established an inference of discrimination,
the court examined facts that may act to rule out an established inference
of discrimination, including the length of time between the plaintiffs ap-
plication for employment and the hiring of a replacement. 140 Therefore,
the Eleventh Circuit treated the lapse of time not as an exception to the
replacement requirement, but as evidence that may be considered while
determining if an inference of discrimination was improperly drawn.' 4 1
134. Carson, 82 F.3d at 158.
135. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (stating that Supreme Court's reasoning "ap-
plies equally to in gender or race context: The fact that one person in the pro-
tected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant
to the prima facie case, so long as she has lost out because of her gender"); Carson,
82 F.3d at 158 (stating that Supreme Court's reasoning is equally applicable to
Title VII discriminatory discharge cases).
136. Compare Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating age
discrimination cases are exceptions to non-class replacement requirement), with
Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (applying O'Connor reasoning to Title VII cases and re-
jecting non-class replacement requirement), and Carson, 82 F.3d at 158 (same).
137. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 906 (affirming grant of summary judgment be-
cause plaintiff failed to show non-class replacement).
138. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's flawed reliance on the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in Howard, see infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
139. Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir. 1984)
(quoting Jones v. W. Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982); Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
140. See Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535 (determining whether lapse of time and
hiring after EEOC filing eliminates inference of discrimination).
141. Compare id. (stating "[tihe hiring ... would scarcely rule out the infer-
ence of discrimination in connection with the earlier denial of Howard's applica-
tion"), with Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (stating that generally plaintiffs must show non-
class replacement but exception exists where there is significant time between em-
ployment application and hiring of replacement).
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The Fourth Circuit in Brown, however, applied opposite reasoning of
the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Howard.142 By stating that a plaintiff
must meet the replacement requirement before a prima facie case of dis-
crimination could be established, the Fourth Circuit limited the situations
from which discrimination could be inferred.143 Thus, unlike the Elev-
enth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit began its decision by assuming discrimina-
tion could not be inferred in Brown's case.1 44 Then, instead of examining
the lapse of time to determine if an inference of discrimination could be
"eliminated," as the Eleventh Circuit did in Howard, the Fourth Circuit
looked at the lapse of time to see if an inference of discrimination could
be "drawn."14 5 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit erred in applying the Elev-
enth Circuit's reasoning in Howard.
14 6
The Fourth Circuit also misapplied several circuit courts' reasoning
that employers may hire another individual from within the protected
class to disguise discrimination against the plaintiff.' 4 7 Federal circuit
courts that have addressed this possibility have relied on it to support argu-
ments that a plaintiffs replacement should not be considered in deter-
mining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of
discrimination.14 3 For example, in Pivirotto, the Third Circuit argued that
142. For a comparison of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning and the Eleventh
Circuit's reasoning, see infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
143. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 1999)
("We can find no justification for limiting the proof necessary to create this infer-
ence [of discrimination] to the potentially irrelevant and only marginally probative
fact that she was (or was not) replaced by a man.").
144. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905 (stating plaintiffs must show they were re-
placed by someone outside their protected class to make out prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge).
145. Compare id. at 905-06 (stating that there are three exceptions to non-class
replacement rule and examining length of time to determine if exception could
be drawn), with Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535 (stating that lapse of time would scarcely
eradicate pre-existing inference of discrimination).
146. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's application of Howard's lapse of
time argument, see supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
147. See Brown, 159 F.2d at 905 (stating that exception may occur when em-
ployers hire individuals from protected class to mask discrimination against plain-
tiff). For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's misapplication of the
argument that an employer may hire a same-class replacement to avoid a lawsuit,
see infra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999) (stat-
ing inflexible rule would preclude suits by employees whose employers replaced
them with protected class member to avoid law suit); Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355
(noting employer may replace plaintiff with member of protected class to avoid
lawsuit); Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535 (recognizing hiring after claim filed with EEOC
cannot rule out inference of discrimination).
The Third Circuit stated the fact that a plaintiff is replaced by someone within
the plaintiffs protected class can be explained in many ways. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d
at 355 (rejecting replacement requirement on basis that replacement within class
does not necessarily indicate that employer did not discriminate). Therefore, the
Third Circuit held that it would be inconsistent with Title VII to make a plaintiff
meet the replacement requirement. See id. (same). The Third Circuit, however,
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an employer might hire a replacement from within the plaintiff's pro-
tected class to hide an act of discrimination and thus avoid a lawsuit.' 49 In
addition, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the employer in Howard may
have hired a same-class replacement to avoid a discrimination suit.' 50
These circuits, however, did not recognize that a plaintiff must prove that
the employer replaced the plaintiff with a member of the plaintiff's pro-
tected class to avoid a lawsuit. 15' In contrast, the Fourth Circuit treats this
argument as something that the plaintiff must prove before a plaintiffs
replacement becomes irrelevant. 152 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's require-
ment of proof of the employer's intent to mask discrimination creates a
higher obstacle for plaintiffs to overcome in the prima facie stage than
that which is applied in other circuit courts. 153
The Fourth Circuit failed to recognize other situations in which a
plaintiff may have a meritorious claim of discrimination even though the
employer hired a same-class replacement.154 For example, both the Third
and Tenth Circuits identified situations where an employer may discharge
an employee based on the employers' stereotypical images of the employ-
ees' protected class.' 5 5 This possibility prompted the Third and Tenth
Circuits to adopt a lenient approach to the plaintiffs burden at the prima
facie stage.15 6 Under a lenient approach like that adopted in the Tenth
and Second Circuits, plaintiffs who have meritorious claims are able to
survive a motion for summary judgment and the burden shifts to the em-
stated, "The fact that a female plaintiff claiming gender discrimination was re-
placed by another woman might have some evidentiary force, and it would be pru-
dent for a plaintiff in this situation to counter (or explain) such evidence." Id.
149. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (noting that employers may replace plaintiffs
with members of plaintiffs' protected class to avoid discrimination suit).
150. See Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535 (recognizing hiring after claim filed with
EEOC cannot rule out inference of discrimination).
151. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (failing to recognize that plaintiff must prove
that employer hired same-class replacement); Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535 (same).
152. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905-06 (finding employer did not replace Brown
with protected individual to hide discrimination). The Fourth Circuit stated,
"Brown has [not] presented any evidence that the city's hiring of a male for the
DCS position was designed to hide discrimination against Brown on the basis of his
gender." Id. at 906.
153. See McGinley, supra note 22, at 229 (noting that courts apply de minimis
burden on plaintiffs during prima facie stage).
154. See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905-06 (failing to discuss situations in which plain-
tiffs may have meritorious claims and are replaced by individual from within pro-
tected class).
155. SeePerryv. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that
employers may fire women who they believe are feminists or fire African-Ameri-
cans who do not "know their place"); Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (stating employers
may discharge employees who do not meet employers' stereotypical image).
156. See Perry, 199 F.3d at 1137 (rejecting strict replacement requirement be-
cause it would preclude meritorious claims); Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (remarking
because of situations in which employers discriminate against plaintiffs but still
hire same-class replacement for plaintiff, it is inconsistent with Title VII to require
plaintiff to show non-class replacement).
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ployer to present reasons for the plaintiffs discharge. 5 7 In the Fourth
Circuit, however, plaintiffs that have meritorious claims, but are replaced
by an individual from their protected class, would not be able to survive a
motion for summary judgment. l5 8 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's failure to
consider the possibility that plaintiffs may be discriminated against despite
the fact that their employers hired a same-class replacement results in the
unjust dismissal of otherwise meritorious claims. 159
3. Failure to Address Underlying Policy Possibly Undermines Decision
Furthermore, in reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit failed to
consider the purpose of the prima facie case, which is to "eliminate the
most obvious, lawful reasons for the defendant's action." 1 60 For example,
in Perry, the Tenth Circuit examined the purpose of the prima facie case
and found that an inference of discrimination is raised when a plaintiff
eliminates the two most common reasons for termination: "lack of qualifi-
cation or the elimination of the job.' 6 1 Federal courts, including the
Tenth Circuit in Perry, also have noted that elimination of the plaintiff's
position does not prevent a plaintiff from establishing a prima facie
case.1 62 Thus, if the Fourth Circuit had applied the reasoning of the
Tenth Circuit and of other federal courts, Brown's claim would have most
likely survived the city's motion for summary judgment by simply showing
that the city sought applicants for the Director of Communications Ser-
vices position.163
157. See, e.g., Perry, 199 F.3d at 1140 (stating that after plaintiffs raise inference
of discrimination burden shifts to employer to dispel inference of discrimination).
158. See, e.g., Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (listing examples where plaintiffs may
have meritorious claims but are replaced by members of their protected class);
McGinley, supra note 22, at 229 (stating plaintiffs burden at prima facie stage was
intended to be de minimis but courts tend to use prima facie case to defeat plain-
tiffs' claims).
159. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's failure to recognize situations in
which plaintiffs may have meritorious claims, but are replaced by someone from
the plaintiffs protected class, see supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
160. Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 351. In Pivirotto, the Third Circuit stated that requir-
ing a plaintiff to show non-class replacement did not eliminate common, lawful
reasons for the plaintiff's discharge. See id. (stating that requiring plaintiff to show
man replaced her did not eliminate common, lawful reasons for discharge). The
Third Circuit distinguished situations in which a plaintiff could not prove that he
or she was qualified for the position and stated that in these situations the plain-
tiffs case should fail because the plaintiff failed to eliminate a lawful reason for the
discharge. See id. (distinguishing failure to show qualification for job from failure
to show non-class replacement).
161. See Perry, 199 F.3d at 1140.
162. See id. at 1140 n.10 (noting elimination ofjob does not necessarily elimi-
nate discrimination claim); accord Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that elimination of position should not prevent plaintiff from establishing
prima facie case).
163. See generally Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 486 (noting that simply ap-
plying McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII cases would allow discriminatory
discharge claims to survive summary judgment).
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In addition, the Fourth Circuit did not address the manner in which
the prima facie elements were intended to be applied.1 64 As the Second
Circuit recognized in Meiri, the elements of proof in an employment dis-
crimination case "were not intended to be 'rigid, mechanized or ritualis-
tic."165 Instead, the elements of proof were only intended to make the
plaintiff "carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to 'raise[ ]
an inference of discrimination. ' 1 66 Additionally, courts have recognized
that a plaintiff's burden at the prima facie stage is de minimis.167 Circuit
courts that have addressed the flexibility of the prima facie case and the
plaintiffs de minimis burden have tended to adopt a more lenient ap-
proach than the strict approach that the Fourth Circuit applies. 16 8 The
Fourth Circuit's adoption of a rigid rule that plaintiffs must show non-class
replacement contravenes the purpose of the prima facie case.' 69 If the
Fourth Circuit would have applied a more lenient approach like other
circuit courts, Brown may have been able to establish a prima facie case by
showing that the city sought a replacement.1 70 Then Brown would have
met his de minimis burden, and the burden would have shifted to the
A simple adaptation of the McDonnell Douglas elements in the discharge
arena serves the purposes originally envisioned by the [Supreme] Court,
by protecting claims with merit from automatic dismissal, while allowing
claims based on thin evidence to be later disposed of at stage three,
where the ultimate issue of discrimination is considered.
Id.
164. See Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1998) (failing to
address purpose of prima facie case).
165. Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
166. Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (quoting Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577).
167. See id. at 996 (noting that prima facie elements were only intended to
make plaintiff carry initial burden and were not intended to be inflexible); see also
Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 486 (stating that Supreme Court did not intend
plaintiff's "prima facie burden to be onerous").
168. See, e.g., Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The
imposition of the inflexible rule . . . is untenable because it could result in the
dismissal of meritorious claims."); Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (noting flexibility of prima
facie elements and finding that plaintiff must only raise inference of
discrimination).
169. See generally Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (stating that because elements of proof
were intended to be flexible, imposition of non-class replacement requirement on
plaintiffs contravenes policies underlying Title VII).
170. See, e.g., Perry, 199 F.3d at 1139 (noting that requiring plaintiff to show
employer continued to seek applicants is superior standard to those followed in
other courts); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996) (requir-
ing plaintiff to show replacement continued to perform plaintiff's work after plain-
tiff's discharge); Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (requiring plaintiffs to show employer
sought replacement for plaintiff); Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d
1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring plaintiffs to show employer sought replace-
ment for plaintiff).
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defendants to provide a non-discriminatory reason for Brown's
termination. 171
V. IMPACT OF FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN BROWN V. MCLEAN
Although the Fourth Circuit treated Brown's discriminatory discharge
claim as a minor and insignificant contention, the court created a prece-
dent for its application in subsequent discriminatory discharge cases. 172
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Brown, however, is vastly inconsistent with
recent federal decisions. 173 In fact, the Fourth Circuit is the only federal
circuit court of appeals to adopt a strict approach, which automatically
precludes a plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory
discharge if the plaintiff fails to show non-class replacement. 174 The result
is an unequal and inconsistent application of Title VII among federal cir-
cuit courts. 175 This inconsistency will hopefully prompt the Supreme
Court to clarify the proper elements of the discriminatory discharge prima
facie case.1 76
Furthermore, by adopting a strict view of the fourth element of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the Fourth Circuit may be precluding plain-
tiffs who have meritorious claims from obtaining a just result.177 Many
circuits have recognized that an employer may have discriminated against
the plaintiff even though the employer replaced the plaintiff with a mem-
ber of the plaintiff's protected class. 178 This recognition is consistent with
171. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 486 (stating that simple adaptation of
prima facie elements allows plaintiffs to survive motion for summaryjudgment and
burden then shifts to defendant).
172. See, e.g., Lowry v. Bedford County Sch. Bd., No. 98-1165, 1999 WL
507137, at *2 (4th Cir. July 19, 1999) (applying Brown holding to discriminatory
discharge prima facie case).
173. See, e.g., Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv. Corp., 220 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir.
2000) (adopting lenient approach to replacement requirement); Perry, 199 F.3d at
1138 (same); Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 199 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 1999)
(same).
174. See Pivirotto, 199 F.3d at 354 n.6 (noting that Fourth Circuit is only fed-
eral circuit court of appeals to adopt strict non-class replacement approach).
175. See Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 487 (noting confusion for litigants of
varying approaches to prima facie case).
176. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 309
(1996) (granting certiorari to determine whether ADEA plaintiff must show non-
class replacement); Chappel, supra note 55, at 211-12 (noting split among circuits
over replacement requirement in ADEA cases prior to Supreme Court's decision
in O'Connor); see also Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 487-88 (noting confusion
among circuits and within circuits over replacement requirement in Title VII dis-
criminatory discharge cases).
177. See, e.g., Perry, 199 F.3d at 1137 (stating that employers may fire women
who they believe are feminists or fire African-Americans who do not "know their
place"); Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355 (stating employers may discharge employees who
do not meet employers' stereotypical image).
178. For a discussion of circuits that recognize that plaintiffs may be dismissed
although they have meritorious claims, see supra notes 153-59 and accompanying
text.
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the plaintiffs de minimis burden at the prima facie stage.' 7 9 The Fourth
Circuit's approach, however, raises the bar that plaintiffs must overcome
to survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment.180 In the Fourth
Circuit, and in courts adopting the Fourth Circuit's approach, plaintiffs
who may have been discriminated against but who were replaced by a
member of their protected class will be excluded from having their day in
court.18 This result contravenes the underlying purpose of Title VII-to
protect individuals from employment discrimination.1 8 2
Christina M. Sautter
179. For a discussion of the underlying policies of the prima facie case, see
supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
180. See McGinley, supra note 22, at 229 (stating burden at prima facie stage
was intended to be de minimis but courts of appeals now use prima facie stage to
defeat plaintiffs' claims).
181. Contra Clack-Freeman, supra note 6, at 491 (stating that lenient approach
protects claims with merit from automatic dismissal).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1995) (prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment arena which is based on sex, religion, race, color and national origin).
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